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sis of the diagnostic thinking processes by analysing think-
aloud protocols of the participants in which they elaborate 
how they reached their diagnosis. The protocols were coded 
according to dual-process theory in which the distinction 
is made between the non-analytical System 1 thinking and 
the analytical System 2 thinking [4]. System 1 is consid-
ered a heuristic response of the mind, which is fast, relying 
on automatic activation of illness scripts stored in memory 
based on limited data from the patient (also called pattern 
recognition), whereas System 2 is considered slow, deliber-
ate, and systematic. By quantifying the number of words 
and concepts occurring in the transcripts of the think-aloud 
protocols, Durning et al. were able to examine whether the 
diagnosis for each item was reached using System 1, System 
2 or a combination of both. One major finding of the study is 
that neither System 1 nor System 2 alone is responsible for 
arriving at a correct diagnosis, but a combination of both.
This finding is important because it reminds us that 
more research is needed to further investigate the interac-
tion between the two systems. Currently it appears that a 
polarization has taken place in the diagnostic reasoning lit-
erature in which one faction of researchers presents System 
1 thinking as the hallmark of medical expertise as it is fast, 
intuitive, and dependent on the experience and knowledge 
of the physician [5], whereas the other camp defends Sys-
tem 2 thinking as the most appropriate diagnostic approach, 
as it is systematic, objective, and supposed to correct errors 
typically associated with System 1 thinking (e.g., premature 
closure and cognitive biases)[6]. Reconciliation between 
both camps is unlikely to happen anytime soon, despite the 
fact that researchers from both sides acknowledge (almost 
like a disclaimer typically at the beginning of introductions 
to their papers) that both Systems interact. However, con-
crete research that has demonstrated how they interact is 
scarce and necessary to advance the field.
There is no doubt that diagnostic reasoning is at the heart 
of the medical profession. Being able to generate a correct 
diagnosis is, however, not always easy and mistakes are 
common. So common that according to some sources 70 % 
of malpractice claims can be ascribed to physician negli-
gence and diagnostic error [1]. As a consequence, medical 
education has focused on the assessment of diagnostic rea-
soning in an attempt to detect flaws in reasoning and correct 
them. Over the years a variety of elaborate assessment for-
mats were introduced, such as key feature problems, script 
concordance tests, mini clinical evaluation exercises, and 
the standardized direct observation tool, to name a few. The 
purpose of these assessments is to gain more insights into 
the process of diagnostic reasoning itself rather than simply 
looking at the ‘end product’ as is the case when using more 
conventional assessment formats such as multiple-choice 
question (MCQ) tests [2]. Despite the fact that MCQ tests 
are routinely used for high-stake medical examinations, a 
common concern of using them is that only the end product 
is measured (i.e., the right answer is selected) without the 
teacher being able to gain detailed insights into the reason-
ing process that led to that answer. This concern, as Durning 
et al., demonstrate in their paper on ‘Dual processing theory 
and experts’ reasoning: exploring thinking on national mul-
tiple-choice questions’, is not necessarily warranted [3].
In their study Durning et al. make use of MCQs to elicit a 
diagnosis and then apply an innovative retrospective analy-
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What follows are three suggestions that may be worth 
considering when exploring this issue further. First, we need 
to take a closer look at how both Systems interact; it is clear 
that they interact, but how they do this is not well under-
stood. For instance, Schmidt and Marmede observed in their 
work on deliberate reflection that the initial generation of 
a diagnostic hypothesis is most likely generated intuitively 
and automatically. Depending on the situation and level of 
expertise of the physician, he or she may feel the need to 
consider (one or) more alternative hypotheses [7]. To com-
pare and contrast the main hypothesis with these alterna-
tive hypotheses, a more deliberate analysis is required [8]. 
In short, it appears that System 1 is always activated to form 
an initial hypothesis and System 2 to evaluate alternative 
options [4]. If the physician has much expertise (e.g., has 
seen signs and symptoms belonging to a particular diagnosis 
frequently before), System 2 may be less likely to be acti-
vated because there is no doubt about the diagnosis. If the 
physician has less expertise regarding the case, it is likely 
that a more deliberate and analytical evaluation of possible 
alternative diagnoses is required.
Second, a clarification is warranted when it comes to 
the issue of case difficulty vs. expertise. Frequently, case 
difficulty (or in the current paper MCQ item difficulty) is 
considered a significant factor that influences diagnostic 
accuracy. The reasoning is straightforward; if a case is rela-
tively more difficult it is more likely that errors occur. Other 
studies stress the level of expertise of the physician in diag-
nostic reasoning; more experienced physicians typically 
make less mistakes. In some studies both are even factored 
in (i.e., high vs. low levels of expertise and high vs. low 
case complexity) [9]. This distinction appears oxymoronic 
because case difficulty is always a function of expertise; an 
experienced physician would find a particular case easy to 
diagnose, whereas a first-year resident may have difficulties 
with the same case in question. The case is the same, but 
the level of expertise varies. Following this logic, it appears 
appropriate to only consider the level of expertise of the 
physician, rather than case difficulty in future studies.
Third and perhaps most important, we need to realize 
that System 1 as well as System 2 are dependent on knowl-
edge. Both the activation of one or more initial hypotheses 
and the analytical assessment of their truth value are based 
on knowledge retrieved from memory. The difficulty with 
memory is that it is prone to error and distortions [10, 11]. 
Such errors and distortions include imagination inflation, 
gist-based and associative-memory errors, post-event misin-
formation effects, and recency effects. It would advance the 
field if research into clinical reasoning were less obsessed 
with distinctions such as those between System 1 and 2, 
and would focus more on how understanding memory can 
inform diagnostic expertise.
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